

**THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR WESTERN WASHINGTON  
SEATTLE DIVISION**

THE THOMPSONS FILM, LLC, )

Plaintiff, )

v. )

Case No. 2:13-cv-560RSL

JOHN DOES 1-194, )

Defendants )

JOHN DOE 51'S MOTION TO  
SEVER & DISMISS AND/OR  
ISSUE A PROTECTIVE ORDER  
AND INCORPORATED  
MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Comes now, John Doe 51 identified by the IP address 24.19.20.244, by and through undersigned counsel, and files this Motion and moves this Court to: sever and dismiss the Defendants and/or issue a protective order in connection on with the subpoena directed at Comcast and objects to the discovery sought. This Court should grant the relief requested. In support, Defendant relies upon the following Memorandum of Law:

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## I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, The Thompsons Film, LLC, is a California corporation that professes to have its principal place of business in California. (See Complaint at Paragraph 18). In this case, Plaintiff neither alleges, nor appears to transact business in, or have any identifiable connections to, the state of Washington (See generally Complaint). Plaintiff claims to be the rights owner of "The Thompsons" a movie that was posted on a website (the "Website"), and claims to have registered this movie with the United States Copyright Office (See Complaint at Paragraph 19), which is hereinafter referred to as the "Works."

In the underlying lawsuit, Plaintiff alleges that one hundred and ninety four (194) "John Doe" Defendants are liable for the infringement and contributory infringement of Plaintiff's copyrights held in "The Thompsons" film because an investigation discovered each Defendant may possibly have copied, downloaded, uploaded and/or shared a BitTorrent file from a website containing Plaintiff's motion picture, "The Thompsons." (See generally Complaint).

Plaintiff uses IP addresses, numbers assigned by an Internet Service Provider (hereinafter referred to as an "ISP") to each subscriber, to identify these John Doe Defendants. On March 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for miscellaneous relief, specifically for Leave to Serve Third Party Subpoenas Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference ("Motion for Expedited Discovery") seeking leave from the United States District Court Western of Washington to issue subpoenas directed at each Defendant's ISP seeking the Defendants' personally identifying information. (See Mot. for Exp. Disc. [Doc. No 4].) The Honorable Robert S.

Lasnik, District Judge, granted Plaintiff's Motion for Expedited Discovery on April 01, 2013. (See Order Granting Mot. for Exp. Disc. [Doc. No. 6].) Plaintiff then caused a subpoena directed at Comcast to be issued from the United States District Court for Western Washington seeking the personally identifying information of John Does 1-194 (the "Subpoena"). (See Exhibit "B," a true and correct copy of the Subpoena which is incorporated by reference herein at if set forth verbatim herein.)

## II. ARGUMENT

### **A. John Doe Defendants 1-50 and 52-194 Should be Severed and Dismissed from this Case due to Misjoinder**

Plaintiff's Complaint improperly joins 194 unrelated individuals as Defendants. As such, John Does 1 through 50 and 52 through 194 should be severed and dismissed from the instant lawsuit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.

Joinder is appropriate under the Federal Rules only if:

(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and

(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). However, even if these parameters are met, joinder is not necessarily mandatory. The Court may order separate trials to protect any party against "embarrassment, delay, expense, or other prejudice." See Fed. R. Civ. 20(b). Where misjoinder occurs, the court may, on just terms, add or drop a party so long as "no substantial right will be prejudiced by severance." AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-97, NO. C-11-3067-CW(DMR), slip op., 2011 WL 2912909, at \*2



(N.D. Cal. July 20, 2011) (quoting Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997)).

**1. Plaintiffs' Claims do Not Arise Out of "the Same Transaction, Occurrence, or Series of Transactions or Occurrences"**

Plaintiff would like this Court to believe that the mere use of BitTorrent protocol by the Defendant's alleged use of BitTorrent protocol does not necessitate the inference that he or she had any interaction with any of the other Defendants in this case. Numerous courts handling similar cases have found that alleged copyright infringement through the use of BitTorrent protocol is insufficient to sustain permissive joinder, both in the Eleventh Circuit<sup>1</sup> and beyond.<sup>2</sup>

As was noted in an analogous case in the Southern District of Florida:

Under the BitTorrent Protocol, it is not necessary that each of the Does ... participated in or contributed to the downloading of each other's copies of the work at issue - or even participated in or contributed to the downloading by any of the [other] Does. Any "pieces" of the work copied or uploaded by any individual Doe may have gone to any other Doe or to any of the potentially thousands who participated in a given swarm. The bare fact that a Doe clicked on a command to participate in the BitTorrent Protocol does not mean that they were part of the downloading by unknown hundreds or thousands of individuals across the country or across the world.

Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. BitTorrent Sxvarm, 277 F.R.D. 672, 675 (SD. Fla. 2011) (quoting Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, 809 F.Supp.2d. 1150,

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., Patrick Collins Inc. v. Does 1-16, No. 6:12-cv-477-ACC-KRS, Order to Show Cause [Doc. No.7] (M.D. Fla Apr. 5, 2012) (plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed case); Liberty Media Holdings LLC v. BitTorrent Swarm, 277 F.R.D. 672 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (severing defendants); Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. BitTorrent Swarm, 277 F.R.D. 669 (SD. Fla 2011) (severing defendants); Raw Films Inc. v. Does 1-32, No. 1:11-CV-2939, slip op., 2011 WL 6840590 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 29, 2011) (order severing defendants); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-35, No.1:11-CV-02940 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2011) (order severing defendants); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1-63, No. 1:11-CV-2941-CAP (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2011) (order severing defendants)

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Third Degree Films v. Does 1-3577, No. C11-02768 LB, slip op., 2011 WL 5374569 (N.D. Cal. Nov.



1 1164 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011)); Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. BitTorrent  
 2 Svvarm, 227 F.R.D. 669, 671 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (same).  
 3

4 Similarly, as was noted in an analogous case in the Eastern District of New  
 5 York:

6 Much of the BitTorrent protocol operates invisibly to the user — after  
 7 downloading a file, subsequent uploading takes place automatically if  
 8 the user fails to close the program. Exhibit D to the complaints, which  
 9 allegedly documents the "interactions" between defendants, is a page  
 10 of machine instructions which clearly demonstrate that the user plays  
 11 no role in these interactions. Indeed, "[t]he bare fact that Doe clicked  
 on a command to participate in the BitTorrent Protocol does not mean  
 that they were part of the downloading by unknown hundreds or  
 thousands of individuals across the country or across the world."

12 Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-188, 809 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1163 (N.D. Cal.  
 13 2011). In re: BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, No. 2:11-cv-  
 14 3995-DRH-GRB, 2012 WL 1570765, at \*11 (E.D.N.Y. Maw 1, 2012). Many  
 15 courts have reasoned that John Doe defendants in analogous lawsuits were  
 16 improperly joined based on the time span between each defendant's alleged  
 17 sharing of the file. Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-16, No. 6:12-cv-477-ACC-KRS,  
 18 Order to Show Cause [Doc. No. 7] (M.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2012) (ordering plaintiff to  
 19 show cause why defendants should not be severed when "access occurred on  
 20 different dates"); Raw Films, Inc. v. Does 1-32, No. 1:11-CV-2939-TWT, slip. op.,  
 21 2011 WL 6840590, at \*2 (N.D. Ga Dec. 29, 2011) (time span of more than 4  
 22 months); K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1-63, No. 1:11-CV-02941-CAP, at 6 (N.D. Ga. Dec.  
 23 5, 2011) (time span of almost 3 months); Liberty Media Holdings LLC, *supra* 277  
 24 F.R.D. at 675 (time span of 2 months); Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v.  
 25  
 26

1 BitTorrent Swarm, 277 F.R.D. at 671 (time span of 2 months); Hard Drive Prods.  
2 Inc., 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1163 (time span of 6 weeks).

3  
4 Plaintiff's counsel recently voluntarily dismissed from the Middle District of  
5 Florida a nearly identical case after Magistrate Judge Spaulding issued an Order  
6 to Show Cause why the defendants should not be severed and dismissed. Patrick  
7 Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-16, No. 6:12-cv-477-ACC-KRS (M .D. Fla Apr. 5, 2012). In  
8 issuing his Order to Show Cause, Magistrate Judge Spaulding reasoned:

9  
10 Exhibit D to the complaint is a computer screen shot that Plaintiff  
11 alleges illustrates the type of interactions in a typical swarm. The  
12 activity in Exhibit D all occurred between 6:10:50 and 6:10:52 on the  
13 same day. Exhibit A to the complaint shows the date and time that  
14 each John Doe Defendant allegedly accessed the protected work. This  
15 access occurred on different dates from different locations throughout  
16 the Middle District of Florida. Thus, contrary to the allegations of the  
17 complaint, it appears that the John Doe Defendants were not acting in  
18 concert and not engaged in the same series of transactions.

19 Id., Order to Show Cause [Doc. No. 7] at \*1 (citations omitted). In this case,  
20 Plaintiff has submitted as Exhibit A to the Complaint the dates and times that  
21 John Doe accessed the "file." It shows files being transferred over one month and  
22 eleven days timeframe. (see Complaint. Exhibit "A" [Doc. No. 1- 1]). Here, just as  
23 in *Patrick Collins*, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants accessed its copyrighted  
24 work on different dates from different locations throughout the Middle District of  
25 Florida. (see Complaint. Exhibit. "A" [Doc. No. 1- 1].) Therefore, just as noted by  
26 Magistrate Judge Spaulding in *Patrick Collins*, it appears the John Doe  
Defendants were not acting in concert and not engaged in the same series of  
transactions.



1 In *Raw Films, Inc.*, the court found that "[d]ownloading a work as part of a  
2 swarm does not constitute 'acting in concert' with one another, particularly when  
3 the transactions happen over a long period." 2011 WL 6840590, at \*2; *see also K-*  
4 *Beech, Inc.*, NO. 1:11-CV-02941-CAP, at 4 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2011) (order granting  
5 motion to sever). In explanation of that finding, the court reasoned that:

7 [t]he differing dates and times of each Defendant's alleged sharing do  
8 not allow for an inference that the Defendants were acting in concert.  
9 While the Defendants may have used the same peer-to-peer system,  
10 the Complaint does not allege that they were sharing with each other.

11 *Id.* at \*2; *see also K-Beech, Inc.*, No. 1:11-CV-02941-CAP, at 5-6 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5,  
12 2011). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants were sharing the file  
13 simultaneously. Plaintiff's evidence shows that there were large time spans  
14 between the different Defendants' alleged sharing of the file. (See Compl. Ex. A.)  
15 In fact, Exhibit A to the Complaint shows that each Defendant is alleged to have  
16 uploaded/downloaded the file once over a period of **MORE THAN TWELVE**  
17 **(12+)** weeks. (See *Id.*)

18 Plaintiff attempts to work around this overwhelming adverse precedent in  
19 the Eleventh Circuit's District Courts by nakedly stating that "[t]he file  
20 containing the subject website is so large that the Defendants' computers must  
21 have worked collaboratively with each other through the process described below  
22 for numerous weeks or months to effectuate a complete download and  
23 redistribution of the subject website," and that "[t]he hit dates listed in the  
24 exhibits are not evidence of when a particular Defendant started the download  
25  
26



1 but are merely evidence of when the investigator's server recorded an IP address  
2 sending a particular piece of data." Plaintiff's tactic is nothing new and has been  
3 plainly rejected by other courts.

4  
5 In the Eastern District of Virginia, Plaintiff filed nine (9) nearly identical  
6 suits, which were also nearly identical to the Complaint filed in this action,  
7 against John Doe defendants alleging the direct and contributory infringement of  
8 the exact same site rip as here. Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1-23, No. 1:12-cv-159  
9 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2012); Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1-26, No. 1:12-cv-160 (E.D.  
10 Va. Feb. 17, 2012); Malibu Media, LLC v Does 1-26, No. 1:12-cv-162 (E.D. Va.  
11 Feb. 17, 2012); Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1-16, No. 1:12-cv-162 (E.D. Va. Feb.  
12 17, 2012); Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1-15, No. 1:12-163 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2012);  
13 Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1-20, No. 1:12-cv-164 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2012); Malibu  
14 Media, LLC v. Does 1-27, No. 1:12-cv-165 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2012); Malibu  
15 Media, LLC v. Does 1-8, No. 1:12-cv-166 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2012); Malibu Media,  
16 LLC v. Does 1-26, No. 1:12-cv-167 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2012). In a join report and  
17 recommendation for these cases, the magistrate judge found that "[w]here, as  
18 here, a plaintiff seeks to join several defendants in an action based on filesharing  
19 activity ... that a plaintiff must allege facts that permit the court at least to infer  
20 some actual, concerted exchange of data between those defendants. In these  
21 cases, as in *K-Beech* and *Hard Drive Productions*, the spans of time shown in  
22 plaintiffs investigations make it difficult to draw the conclusion on that there has  
23 been any actual exchange of data between and among the defendants in each  
24  
25  
26

1 case." Malibu Media, No. 1:12-cv-164, Report & Recommendation [Doc. No.10] at  
2 8. The magistrate judge noted that "Exhibit A to the complaint in each case  
3 shows a span of at least two and a half months, and up to three and a half months  
4 between the "hit dates" for the first and last defendants," and recommended that  
5 "all but the first of the Doe defendants in each of these matters be severed." *Id.* at  
6 8 n.1, 9.

7  
8 Severance of the Defendants in this and similar cases is only consistent  
9 with the common sense notion that "[i]n this age of instant digital gratification, it  
10 is difficult to imagine, let alone believe, that an alleged infringer of the  
11 copyrighted work would patiently wait six weeks to collect the bits of the work  
12 necessary to watch the work as a whole." *Hard Drive Productions v. Does 1-188*,  
13 809 F.Supp.2d at 1163 (quoting *Boy Racer v. Does 2-52*, No. 11-2834-LHK-PSG,  
14 [Doc. No. 12], at \*6).

15  
16  
17 Plaintiff's allegation that all of the Defendants shared a file identified by  
18 the same "hash tag" does not warrant the implication that Defendants exchanged  
19 any piece of the relevant file with each other or actually acted in concert with one  
20 another. *See, e.g., MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1149*, No. C 11-02331 LB, slip op., 2011  
21 WL 4352110, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (finding misjoinder where the  
22 plaintiff failed to show that any of the defendants actually exchanged any piece of  
23 the seed file with one another); *Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does 1-60*, No. C 11-01738 SI,  
24 slip op., 2011 WL 3652521, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (finding misjoinder  
25 because "Plaintiff [did] not plead facts showing that any particular defendant  
26

1 illegally shared plaintiff's work with any other particular defendant"). Plaintiff's  
 2 allegations that Defendants committed the same type of violation in the same  
 3 way simply does not equate to participation in the same transaction, occurrence,  
 4 or series of transactions or occurrences. See LaFace Records, LLC v. Does 1-38,  
 5 No. 5:07-CV-298-BR, 2008 WL 544992, at \*7 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008). This basis  
 6 alone is sufficient to warrant the severance of the Defendants.  
 7

8 **2. Joinder will Result in a Lack of Judicial Economy and**  
 9 **Prejudice the Defendants Moving Forward**

10 "Among the factors to be considered by the court in exercising its discretion  
 11 under Rule 21 are whether judicial economy would be facilitated, whether  
 12 prejudice would be avoided if severance were granted, and whether different  
 13 witnesses and documentary proof are required for the separate claims." Hartley v.  
 14 Clark, No. 3:09cv559/RV/EMT, 2010 WL 1187880, at \*4 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2010);  
 15 see also, 7 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1652, at  
 16 396 (3d ed. 2001) ("[T]he court has discretion to deny joinder if it determines that  
 17 the addition of the party under Rule 20 will not foster the objective of the rule,  
 18 but will result in prejudice, expense or delay").  
 19

20 While Plaintiff's litigation tactic of joining unrelated Defendants in this  
 21 action results in substantial economic benefit to the Plaintiff, it results in an  
 22 overall lack of judicial economy for the Court and Defendants. In effect, Plaintiff's  
 23 improper joinder tactics rob the court of the fees it requires to adjudicate such  
 24 actions. In a similar case, the Northern District of Illinois recognized that:  
 25  
 26



1 In addition to the procedural improprieties outlined above, the  
 2 plaintiffs' tactics deny the federal courts additional revenue from  
 3 filing fees in the suits that should be filed to obtain the information  
 4 the plaintiffs desire. CP Prods., 2011 WL 737761, at \*1 ("No predicate  
 5 has been shown for thus combining 300 separate actions on the cheap  
 — if CP had sued the 300 claimed infringers separately for their  
 discrete infringements, the filing fees along would have aggregated  
 \$105,000 rather than \$350.")

6 Pacific Century Int'l, LTD v. Does 1-37, No. 1:12-cv-01057 (consolidated action),  
 7 2012 WL 1072312, at \*5 n.15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012).

8 This was also recognized and discussed in great detail in an analogous case  
 9 in the Eastern District of New York:

10  
 11 In multidistrict cases considering severance of cases, courts have  
 12 noted that the filing fee has: two salutary purposes. First, it is a  
 13 revenue raising measure... Second, §1914(a) acts as a threshold  
 14 barrier, albeit a modest one, against the filing of frivolous or otherwise  
 15 meritless lawsuits. Had each plaintiff initially instituted a separate  
 16 lawsuit as should have occurred here, a fee would have been collected  
 for each one... Thus, the federal fisc and more particularly the federal  
 courts are being wrongfully deprived of their due. By misjoining  
 claims a lawyer or party need not balance the payment of the filing fee  
 against the merits of the claim or claims.

17 In re Diet Drugs, 325 F. Supp. 2d 540, 541-42 (E.D. Pa. 2004); *see also* In re  
 18 Seroquel Prods Liability Litig., 2007 WL 737589, at \*2-3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2007)  
 19 (denying reduction of filing fees, noting the burden on the court and the  
 "gatekeeping feature of a filing fee").

20 Several courts in similar cases involving BitTorrent protocol have also  
 21 recognized the effect of a countenancing a single filing fee. One court described  
 22 the "common arc of the plaintiffs' litigation tactics" in these cases:  
 23

24 "...these mass copyright infringement cases have emerged as a strong  
 25 tool for leveraging settlements - a tool whose efficacy is largely  
 26 derived from the plaintiffs' success in avoiding the filing fees for  
 multiple suits and gaining early access en masse to the identities of  
 alleged infringers." Pacific Century, 2012 WL 1072312, at \*3.

1 “Thus, the plaintiffs file a single case, and pay one filing fee, to limit  
2 their expenses as against the amount of settlements they are able to  
3 negotiate. Postponing a determination on joinder in these cases  
4 “results in lost revenue of perhaps millions of dollars (from lost filing  
5 fees) and only encourages plaintiffs in copyright actions to join (or  
6 misjoin) as many doe defendants as possible.” K-Beech, Inc. v. John  
7 Does 1-41, 2012 WL 773683, at \*5 (S.D. Tex. 2012).

8 “In the four cases before this Court, plaintiffs have improperly avoided  
9 more than \$25,000 in filing fees by employing its swarm joinder  
10 theory. Considering all the cases filed by just these three plaintiffs in  
11 this district, more than \$100,000 in filing fees have been evaded. If  
12 the reported estimates that hundreds of thousands of such defendants  
13 have been sued nationwide, plaintiffs in similar actions may be  
14 evading millions of dollars in filing fees annually. Nationwide, these  
15 plaintiffs have availed themselves of the resources of the court system  
16 on a scale rarely seen. It seems improper that they should profit  
17 without paying statutorily required fees.” *In re: BitTorrent Adult Film*  
18 *Copyright Infringement Cases*, 2012 WL 1570765, at \*13.

19 “In the joint Report & Recommendation in Malibu Media, LLC v. Does  
20 1-23, No. 1:12-cv-159, the Magistrate Judge “inquired of the Clerk’s  
21 staff, and has been advised that the alternative scenario of multiple  
22 suits described by plaintiff will not burden that office.” *Id.* at 9.

23 Further, if this case proceeds, Plaintiff is likely to make further discovery  
24 requests against each individual Defendant that will further increase complexity  
25 and cost. This is the exact situation in which the Northern District of California  
26 found itself when it failed to sever the defendants in a similar case:

27 [Plaintiff] would require nothing less than an inspection of the  
28 subscriber’s electronically stored information and tangible things,  
29 including each of the subscriber’s computer and computers of those  
30 sharing his internet network .... Presumably, every desktop, laptop,  
31 smartphone, and tablet in the subscriber’s residence, and perhaps any  
32 residence of any neighbor, houseguest or other sharing his internet  
33 access, would be fair game. Beyond such an inspection, [Plaintiff]  
34 might require still more discovery, including interrogatories, document  
35 requests and even depositions.

36 Boy Race, Inc. v. Does 2-52, No. 11-CV-2329-PSG, at 4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2011)



1 (order denying further discovery).

2 The courthouse circus which will likely ensue if the Defendants are not  
 3 severed will result in economic prejudice to the Defendants moving forward. *See*,  
 4 *e.g.*, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 11C Music, 202 F.R.D. 229, 233 (M.D. Tenn. 2001)  
 5 ("If joined in one action, hundreds of Defendants will be subject to an  
 6 overwhelming onslaught of materials and information unrelated to the specific  
 7 claims against them - all of which they must pay their attorneys to review"). To  
 8 prevent prejudicing the Defendants and maximize judicial economy, this Court  
 9 should sever and dismiss the all but the first Defendant from this case.  
 10  
 11

12 **B. This Court Should Issue a Protective Order Preventing or Limiting the**  
 13 **Disclosure of John Doe 51's Personally Identifying Information by**  
 14 **Comcast**

15 Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c) indicates that a Motion to  
 16 Quash be filed in the district court for the district that issued the Subpoena, it  
 17 does not alter the general rule that the broad outlines of discovery in a civil case  
 18 are to be controlled by the court in which the case is filed. Straily v. UBS Fin.  
 19 Servs., Inc., No. 07-cv-884-REB-KMT, 2008 WL 5378148, at \*2 (D. Colo. Dec. 23,  
 20 2008); Wells v. GC Servs. LP, No. C06-03511 RMW HRL, 2007 WL 1068222, at \*1  
 21 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2007); Manufacturer Direct, LLC v. Directbuy, Inc., No. 2:05-  
 22 cv-451, 2007 WL 496382, at \*2-3 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 12, 2007); Platinum Air  
 23 Charters, LLC v. Aviation Ventures, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-01451-RCJ-LRL, 2007 WL  
 24 121674, at \*3 (D. Nev. Jan. 10, 2007); Best Western Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. cv-06-  
 25 1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 2091695, at \*2 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006); Static Control  
 26 Components, Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, 201 F.R.D. 431, 434 (M.D.N.C. 2001)



(district where case was pending had authority to issue protective order, pursuant to its right to control general outline of discovery, even though the particular discovery dispute arose from subpoena issued in another district) (citing Fincher v. Keller Indus., Inc., 129 F.R.D. 123, 125 (M.D.N.C. 1990)); Pilcher v. Direct Equity Lending, No. 99-1245-JTM, 2000 WL 33170865, at \*4 n.8 (D. Kan. Dec. 22, 2000) ("Under Rule 26(c), the court in which the action is pending . . . has jurisdiction to issue a protective order limiting discovery"). A party's "discovery rights [in other districts] can rise no higher than their level in the district of trial." Fincher, 129 F.R.D. at 125. As such, this Court possesses the authority to both hear and grant the relief requested in John Doe 4's motion for a Rule 26 and/or 30(d) protective order to prohibit or limit discovery of his personally identifying information. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) ("a party may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3)(1) ("The motion may be filed in the court where the action is pending").

**1. A Protective Order Should Be Issued Because the Information Sought by the Subpoena is Irrelevant**

"The foremost fundamental principle regarding subpoenaed discovery is that a subpoena duces tecum to obtain material in advance of trial should be issued only when the party seeking the materials can show that the materials are evidentiary and relevant." Straily v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 07-cv-884-REB-KMT, 2008 WL 5378148, at \*1 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2008); 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 20. A protective order may properly be issued when a subpoena seeks irrelevant information. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 426, 429 (M.D. Fla. 2005); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). The term "relevant" as

1 used in Rule 26 is broad, but not exhaustive. While matters which may aid a  
2 party in the preparation or presentation of its case are relevant, matters without  
3 bearing either as direct evidence or as leads to evidence are not within the scope  
4 of inquiry. See Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 27 F.Supp. 946 (D. Conn.  
5 1939). As the Subpoena here was issued prior to the Rule 26(f) conference, the  
6 relevancy of the discovery sought should be even more narrowly tailored to that  
7 information which is necessary to definitely and immediately allow Plaintiff to  
8 proceed with this lawsuit. Here, the subpoenaed information will not allow  
9 Plaintiff to identify the individuals responsible for infringing its copyright and  
10 who could properly be named as Defendants in this lawsuit.  
11  
12

13 The discovery requested through Plaintiff's Subpoena is based on the  
14 faulty assumption that the Internet subscribers identified in Exhibit A to the  
15 Complaint are the individuals who actually infringed Plaintiff's copyright.  
16 However, Plaintiff admits that the only individual that can be identified through  
17 an IP address is an ISP subscriber. (Decl. of Tobias Fieser [Doc. No. 32] ¶¶ 8-9.)  
18 Many courts have recognized that "the ISP subscribers to whom a certain IP  
19 address was assigned may not be the same person who used the Internet  
20 connection for illicit purposes." SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Does 1-3036, No. 11-4220  
21 SC, 2011 WL 6002620, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011); e.g. In re: Ingenuity 13  
22 LLC, No. 2:11-mc-0084-JAM-DAD, Order [Doc. No. 24], at \*10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21,  
23 2012) ("the identities of the subscribers associated with the identified IP  
24 addresses... would not reveal who actually downloaded petitioner's work, since  
25 the subscriber's internet connection could have been used by another person at  
26



the subscriber's location, or by an unknown party who obtained access to the subscriber's internet connection without authorization"); Hard Drive Productions, Inc. v. Does 1-130, No. C-11-3826-DMR, 2011 WL 553960, at \*2 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 16, 2011) ("Plaintiff concedes, in some cases the Subscriber and the Doe Defendant will not be the same individual"); Pac. Century Int'l Ltd. v. Does 1-101, No. C-11-02533-DMR, 2011 WL 5117424, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011).

An IP address provides only the location at which one of any number of computer devices may be deployed, especially when used with a wireless router. 3 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York noted that:

If you only connect one computer to the Internet, that computer can use the address from your ISP. Many homes today, though, use routers to share a single Internet connection between multiple computers. Wireless routers have become especially popular in recent years, avoiding the need to run network cables between rooms. If you use a router to share an Internet connection, the router gets the IP address issued directly from the ISP. Then, it creates and manages a subnet for all the computers connected to that router.

In re: BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 2012 WL 1570765, at \*3 (quoting "What is an IP address?" at <http://computer.howstuffworks.com>).

Thus, it is even less likely that an ISP subscriber (e.g. John Doe 51) carried out a particular computer function than that an individual who pays a home telephone bill made a specific call. It is possible that any family member living in that household, or visitor of that household, could have performed the complained of infringement. Unless the wireless router had been appropriately secured (and that security had not been compromised), neighbors or a passersby could assess

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3 One study has shown that 61% of all U.S. homes now have wireless access to the Internet. Lardinois F., "Study: 61% of US Households Now Have WiFi," available at <http://techcrunch.com>, 4/5/2012.

1 the Internet using the IP address assigned to a particular subscriber and  
 2 download Plaintiff's works. Illustrating this fact, the court in VPR International  
 3 v. Does 1-1017, 2:11-cv-02068-HAB-DGB (C.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2011) cited an  
 4 instance involving a raid by federal agents on a home that was linked to  
 5 downloaded child pornography:  
 6

7 The identity and location of the subscriber were provided by the ISP.  
 8 The desktop computer, iPhones, and iPads of the homeowner and his  
 9 wife were seized in the raid. Federal agents returned the equipment  
 10 after determining that no one at the home had downloaded the illegal  
 11 material. Agents eventually traced the downloads to a neighbor who  
 had used multiple ISP subscribers' Wi-Fi connections (including a  
 secure connection from the State University of New York).

12 Id. at 2 (citing Carolyn Thompson, Bizarre Pornography Raid Underscores Wi-Fi  
 13 Privacy Risks (April 25, 2011), ([http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42740201/ns/](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42740201/ns/technology-and-science-wireless)  
 14 [technology/ and science-wireless](http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42740201/ns/technology-and-science-wireless)).

15 These circumstances create serious doubt as to Plaintiff's claim that the  
 16 expedited discovery sought will produce information sufficient to identify the  
 17 individuals who actually infringed upon Plaintiff's copyright. As one judge  
 18 observed:  
 19

20 The Court is concerned about the possibility that many of the names  
 21 and addresses produced in response to Plaintiff's discovery request  
 22 will not in fact be those of the individuals who downloaded "My Little  
 23 Panties # 2." The risk is not purely speculative; Plaintiff's counsel  
estimated that 30% of the names turned over by ISPs are not  
those of the individuals who actually downloaded or shared  
copyrighted material.

24 Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-176, --F.R.D.--, 2012 WL 263491, at \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.  
 25 30, 2012) (emphasis added); *also* SBO Pictures, 2011 WL 6002620, at \*3. In a  
 26 denying expedited discovery in a similar case, the Eastern District of California



1 noted:

2  
3 Although the revised Hansmeier declaration clarifies that he observed  
4 the co-conspirators' IP addresses engaged in the same downloading  
5 and uploading as John Doe, the declaration still does not establish  
6 that none of the internet subscribers whose information plaintiff seeks  
7 to obtain are innocent internet users. The concern remains that  
8 potentially non-offending users' information is being sought....  
9 Because plaintiff seeks information about the "ISP subscribers who  
10 were assigned certain IP addresses, instead of the actual Internet  
11 users who allegedly engaged in infringing activity, 'Plaintiff's sought-  
12 after discovery has the potential to draw numerous innocent internet  
13 users into the litigation, placing a burden upon them that weighs  
14 against allowing the discovery as designed.'" Id. (quoting Hard Drive  
15 Prods., 2011 WL 5573960, at \*2).

16 First Time Videos, LLC v. Doe, No. 2:11-cv-3478-GEB-EFB, 2012 WL 423714, at \*  
17 5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2011).

18 Further, studies have shown that the type of tracking software used by  
19 investigators, such as IPP, International, to identify BitTorrent users often  
20 produces a large number of false positive IP hits. One study performed by the  
21 Department of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of  
22 Washington determined that "copyright holders utilize inconclusive methods for  
23 identifying infringing BitTorrent users. [The Researchers] were able to generate  
24 hundreds of DMCA takedown notices for machines under [their] control at the  
25 University of Washington that were not downloading or sharing any content."  
26 Michael Piatek et al., *Challenges and Directions for Monitoring P2P File Sharing  
Networks -or- Why My Printer Received a DMCA Takedown Notice*, 3<sup>rd</sup> USENIX  
Workshop on Hot Topics in Security 2008, (July 29, 2008)  
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42740201/ns/technology/>.

1 That article specifically concludes:

2  
3 [W]e find that it is possible for a malicious user (or buggy software) to  
4 implicate (frame) seemingly any network endpoint in the sharing of  
5 copyrighted materials. We have applied these techniques to frame  
6 networked printers, a wireless (non-NAT) access point, and an  
7 innocent desktop computer, all of which have since received DMCA  
8 takedown notices but none of which actually participated in any P2P  
9 networks.

10 Id.

11 Accordingly, the information sought by Plaintiff regarding the identity of  
12 John Doe 51 is irrelevant to this lawsuit based on inaccuracy of the tracking  
13 software and the fact that many individuals will often access the Internet  
14 through the same ISP account. As such, this Court should issue a protective order  
15 preventing or limiting the disclosure of John Doe 51's personally identifying  
16 information by Comcast.

17 **2. A Protective Order Should Be Issued to Protect John Doe 51 from Annoyance, Embarrassment, Oppression, and Undue Burden and Expense, and/or Disclosure of Confidential information**

18 "Restrictions on discovery may be broader where a non-party is the target  
19 of discovery to protect such third parties from unnecessary harassment,  
20 inconvenience, expense or disclosure of confidential information." In re Condor  
21 Diamond Corp., 26 B.R. 847, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing Dart Indus. Co. v.

22 <sup>4</sup> Many ISPs, including Comcast, qualify as a "cable operators" as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 522(5).

23  
24 Westwood Chem. Co., 649 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1980); Pollitt v. Mobay Chems.  
25 Corp., 95 F.R.D. 101, 103 (S.D. Ohio 1982))Z see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).  
26

Numerous courts have observed that subpoenas directed at ISPs seeking



1 the personally identifying information of account holders issued in lawsuits  
2 brought by pornographers, such as Malibu Media, LLC, are not likely to result in  
3 clams being litigated on the merits. Rather, such information will be used for the  
4 exclusive purpose of embarrassing the ISP subscribers in attempts at coercing  
5 them into oppressive settlements through the use of Plaintiff's non-attorney  
6 agents that operate similarly to collection agencies. *e.g.* Raw Films, Inc. v. Does 1-  
7 32, No. 1:11-cv-2939-TWT, slip. op., 2011 WL 6840590, at \*2 n.5 (N.D. Ga. Dec.  
8 29, 2011) ("The risk of inappropriate settlement leverage is enhanced in a case  
9 like this involving salacious and graphic sexual content where a defendant may  
10 be urged to resolve a matter at an inflated value to avoid disclosure of the content  
11 the defendant was accessing"); Digital Sin, 2012 WL 263491, at \*3 ("This risk of  
12 false positives gives rise to the potential for coercing unjust settlements from  
13 innocent defendants such as individuals who want to avoid the embarrassment of  
14 having their names publicly associated with allegations of illegally downloading  
15 'My Little Panties # 2'"); Hard Drive Prods., 2011 WL 5573960, at \*3 ("the court  
16 shares the concern that these cases potentially open the door to abusive  
17 settlement tactics"); VPR International, No. 2:11-cv-2068-HAB-DGB, Order [Doc.  
18 No. 15], at 3 ("Could expedited discovery be used to wrest quick settlements, even  
19 from people who have done nothing wrong? The embarrassment of public  
20 exposure might be too great, the legal system too daunting and expensive, for  
21 some to ask whether VPR has competent evidence to prove its case").  
22  
23  
24  
25

26 In Plaintiff's home state of California, courts have decried similar abuses of expedited discovery.

1 Plaintiff also never addressed how the litigation strategy it adopted is  
 2 fair to any defendant.... Even though plaintiff justified the need for  
 3 expedited discovery so it could identify and serve Doe defendants  
 4 (Docket No. 6), eleven months after the complaint was filed, not a  
 5 single Doe has been served.... Instead, plaintiff appears to have used  
 6 the information from the subpoena for a different purpose: to extract  
 7 settlements from out-of-state defendants by notifying them that they  
 8 have been sued in California, knowing that it is highly unlikely that  
 9 many of them will be amenable to suit in California.... This Court does  
 10 not condone copyright infringement and encourages settlement of  
 11 genuine disputes. However, plaintiff's desire to enforce its copyright in  
 12 what it asserts is a cost-effective manner does not justify perverting  
 13 the joinder rules to first create the management and logistical  
 14 problems discussed above and then offer to settle with Doe defendants  
 15 so that they can avoid digging themselves out of the morass plaintiff is  
 16 creating.

17 In On the Cheap, LLC v. Does 1-5011, --F.R.D.--, 2011 WL 4018258, at \*4 (E.D.  
 18 Cal. Sept. 6, 2011). In denying a plaintiff's motion for expedited discovery in a  
 19 similar case, the Eastern District of California reasoned that:

20 as numerous other courts have noted, if the undersigned were to grant  
 21 plaintiff's renewed request for expedited discovery regarding the  
 22 alleged co-conspirators, "[p]laintiff would likely send settlement  
 23 demands to the individuals whom the ISP identified as the IP  
 24 subscriber. That individual — whether guilty of copyright  
 25 infringement or not — would then have to decide whether to pay  
 26 money to retain legal assistance to fight the claim that he or she  
 27 illegally downloaded sexually explicit materials, or pay the money  
 28 demanded. This creates great potential for a coercive and unjust  
 29 settlement." SBO Pictures, Inc., 2011 WL 6002620, at \*3 (quoting  
 30 Hard Drive Prods., 2011 WL 5573960, at \*3).

31 First Time Videos, LLC, 2012 WL 423714, at \*5.

32 Recently, Judge Gary Brown issued an opinion in the Eastern District of  
 33 New York lambasting the unfair litigation tactics that Plaintiff is attempting to  
 34 employ here. In that case one of the John Doe Defendants had submitted a sworn  
 35 declaration on stating:



1 Upon receipt of the Complaint, I reached out to Plaintiff and spoke to  
 2 a self-described "Negotiator" in an effort to see if I could prove to them  
 3 (without the need for publicly tying my name to the Complaint) that I  
 4 had nothing to do with the alleged copyright infringements. **The**  
 5 **Negotiator was offered unfettered access to my computer, my**  
 6 **employment records, and any other discovery they may need**  
 7 **to show that I was not the culpable party.** Instead, the  
 8 Negotiator refused and was only willing to settle the Complaint for  
 9 thousands of dollars. While the Negotiator said on October 24, 2011  
 that he would check to see if he could come down from the thousands  
 of dollar settlement amount, the Negotiator has not responded to two  
 voice mails that were left on October 25, 2011. Notably, the  
 Negotiator justified the settlement amounts because, in part, I would  
 incur legal fees in hiring an attorney.

10 In re: BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 2012 WL 1570765, at  
 11 \*5 (citing K-Beech, Decl. of John Doe #16 [Doc. No. 16], at 11-12) (emphasis in  
 12 original). Judge Brown recognized that:

13 John Doe #16's experience directly mirrors that of defendants in a  
 14 separate action by plaintiff K-Beech regarding *Gang Bang Virgins*, as  
 15 well as another action filed by Patrick Collins, Inc. relating to a film  
 16 entitled *Cuties*. See K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1-85, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  
 17 124581, at \*6 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011) ("Some defendants have  
 18 indicated that the plaintiff has contacted them directly with harassing  
 19 telephone calls, demanding \$2,900 in compensation to end the  
 litigation") and Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-58, 2011 U.S. Dist.  
 LEXIS 120235, at \*6 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011) (same); cf. Raw Films,  
Ltd. v. Does 1-32, 2011 WL 6182025, at \*2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011)  
 (same).

20 Id. Judge Brown concluded that "[t]his course of conduct indicates that the  
 21 plaintiffs have used the offices of the Court as an inexpensive means to gain the  
 22 Doe defendants' personal information and coerce payment from them. The  
 23 plaintiffs seemingly have no interest in actually litigating the cases, but rather  
 24 simply have used the Court and its subpoena powers to obtain sufficient  
 25 information to shake down the John Does." Id. (quoting Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does  
 26

1 1-32, No. 3:11-cv-532-JAG, slip. op., 2011 WL 6182025, at \*3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5,  
2 2011)).

3  
4 "[C]ourts must be vigilant to ensure that their processes are not used  
5 improperly for purposes unrelated to their role." Paisley Park Enterprises, Inc. v.  
6 Uptown Prods., 54 F.Supp.2d 347, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); *also* U.S ex rel. Phillips v.  
7 Front Range Home Improvements, Ltd., No. 06-cv-927-WYD-MJW, 2008 WL  
8 2477602, at \*1 (D. Colo. Jun. 18, 2008) (same); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.  
9 Minor, 2007 WL 4365694, at \*1 (D. Colo., Dec. 10, 2007) (same); Drake v.  
10 Benedek Broadcasting Corp., No. Civ. 99-2227-GTV, 2000 WL 156825, at \*2 (D.  
11 Kan. Feb. 9, 2000) (same). Plaintiff should be prevented from manipulating this  
12 Court into using its powers to further Plaintiff's extortionary intentions. *See, e.g.,*  
13 K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1-41, No. V-11-46, slip. op., 2012 WL 773683, at \*4 (SD.  
14 Tex. Mar. 8, 2012) ("the Court finds that the potential for coercing unjust  
15 settlements from innocent defendants trumps K-Beech's interest in maintaining  
16 low litigation costs"); Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1-26, No. 1:12-cv-161-CMH-  
17 TRJ, Report & Recommendation [Doc. No. 11], at \*8-9 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2012)  
18 (same) (for 9 consolidated cases).

19  
20  
21 Additionally, the Subpoena seeks confidential personally identifying  
22 information that Comcast has on file about its subscriber John Doe 51. Section  
23 551 of the Cable Communications Act of 1984 requires that IPSs<sup>4</sup> notify their  
24 subscribers before disclosing any personally identifiable information. 47 U.S.C. §  
25 551(c)(2); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 n.4 (Del. 2005); H.R. Rep. 98-934, at  
26 \*77 ("Subsection (c) limits the disclosure of personally identifiable information



1 collected by a cable operator to those situations ... required by court order,  
2 provided that the subscriber has been notified of the disclosure..."). Congress  
3 established this requirement because subscribers have a privacy interest in their  
4 personally identifying information on record with their ISPs. HR. Rep. 98-934, at  
5 \*79 ("The Congress is recognizing a right of privacy in personally  
6 identifiable information collected and held by a cable company...")  
7 (emphasis added).  
8

9 The expedited discovery sought through Plaintiff's Subpoena is likely to  
10 annoy, embarrass, and humiliate John Doe 51, who is likely an innocent ISP  
11 subscriber. Further, it is oppressive in so far as it furthers Plaintiff's unfair  
12 litigation tactics intended to coerce John Doe 51, and other likely innocent ISP  
13 subscribers, into settling Plaintiff's claims for thousands of dollars in order to  
14 avoid the embarrassment of being associated with pornography. Without  
15 establishing its entitlement to the information sought by a "good cause" need for  
16 expedited discovery of information that is irrelevant to this lawsuit, the Subpoena  
17 seeks discovery confidential information, in which Congress has recognized the  
18 Defendant's right to privacy. As such, this Court should issue a protective order  
19 preventing or limiting the disclosure of John Doe 51's personally identifying  
20 information by Comcast.  
21  
22  
23

### 24 III. CONCLUSION

25 Plaintiff has demonstrated that it is far more interested in obtaining ISP  
26 subscribers' contact information for use in extracting large settlements than the

1 formalities of the legal process and privacy interests of the affected individuals.  
 2 Plaintiff's joinder of Defendants is improper because Plaintiff's claims do not  
 3 arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series thereof, and it prejudices  
 4 the Defendants while undermining judicial economy. The discovery sought by  
 5 the Subpoena will subject John Doe 51 to annoyance, embarrassment, undue  
 6 burden, is oppressive, and seeks information to which he has a congressionally  
 7 recognized right to privacy.  
 8

9  
 10 **WHEREFORE**, Defendant John Doe 51 respectfully requests that this  
 11 Court Dismiss the case against John Doe 51 and/or Sever Defendants one through  
 12 fifty and fifty-two through one hundred ninety-four, allowing Plaintiff to bring  
 13 individual actions against each Defendant, if it so chooses, in a court of the  
 14 appropriate venue;  
 15

16 (a) Issue a protective order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and/or 30(d)  
 17 prohibiting the ISP Comcast from disclosing any of John Doe 51's  
 18 personally identifying information;  
 19

20 (b) Grant such other and further relief to which John Doe 51 may justly be  
 21 entitled.  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25  
 26



1 Respectfully submitted,  
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6 /s/ Timothy M. Greene  
7 **TIMOTHY M. GREENE,**  
8 WASHINGTON STATE BAR NO. 17499  
9 tgreene01@hotmail.com  
10 of Attorneys for John Doe 51

11  
12  
13 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

14 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31<sup>st</sup> day of May, 2013, a true and correct  
15 copy of the foregoing was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF  
16 and on all of those parties receiving electronic notification via the Court's  
CM/ECF electronic filing.

17 By: /s/ Timothy M. Greene  
18 **TIMOTHY M. GREENE**  
19  
20  
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22  
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25  
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